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ARE NONCONVEXITIES IMPORTANT FOR UNDERSTANDING GROWTH?
ABSTRACT
Everydayexperience and a simple logical argument show that nonconvexities are
essential for understanding growth. Compared to previous statements of this well known
argument, the presentation here places more emphasis on the distinction between two of
the fundamental attributes of any economic good: rivalry and excludability. It also
emphasizes the difference between public goods and the technological advances that are
fundamental to economic growth. Like public goods, technological advances are rionrival
goods. Hence, they are inextricably linked to nonconvexities. But in contrast to public
goods, which are nonexcludable, technological advances generate benefits that are at least
partially excludable. Hence, innovations in the technology are for the most part privately
provided. This means that nonconvexities are relevant for goods that trade in private
markets. Consequently, an equilibrium with price-taking in all markets cannot be
sustained. Concluding remarks describe some of the recent equilibrium growth models that
do not rely on price-taking and highlight some of the implications of these models.
Paul M. Romer
Universityof Chicago and
Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences
202 Junipero Sera Boulevard
Stanford, CA 94305When economic reasoning is supplemented only by everyday experience, it leads to
few definite conclusions. Systematic data collection and econometric analysis are usually
needed to tell whether it is the one hand or the other hand that holds the right conclusion.
The title of this note poses one of the few important questions that can be resolved (in the
affirmative) using logic and the kind of evidence reported in the newspaper.
I. Are there nonconvexities?
The Wall Street Journal reported last week that 2 former employees of Du Pont
were convicted of extortion. They had threatened to reveal trade secrets about how to
make Lycra. Earlier in the year, the paper reported a suit against a former employee of
Intel over his alleged use of secrets learned there. It also described an investigation of a
firm that used illicitly acquired mechanical drawings and metallurgical formulas to
manufacture replacement blades for General Electric turbines.
These incidents have two things in common. First, the value of the economic good
at stake is not small. The extortionists asked Du Pont for $10 million. Intel claims that it
has invested $lOOs of millions on the design of its microprocessors. General Electric claims
that its investment in the design of turbine blades is worth more than $200 million.
Second, the notion of theft is unusual. The companies involved were not deprived of the
use of the input that was allegedly stolen. Du Pont could still use its secret process for
making Lycra. Intel could still use its chip designs. General electric could still use its
mechanical drawings and metallurgical formulas to make turbine blades.
These examples, and hundreds more like them, show that there are valuable inputs
in production that can be used simultaneously in more than one activity. In public finance,
consumption goods with this property are referred to as nonrival consumption goods. Byanalogy, I have referred to goods like a chemical process, a chip design, a mechanical
drawing, or a metallurgical formula as nonrival inputs in production (Romer 1990).
There are (at least) two ways to think about nonrival inputs. One is to treat a good
like a design or a list of instructions as something that is distinct from the medium on
which it is stored and to say that it can be used simultaneously by arbitrarily many
different firms and people. A more literal way to describe a nonrival good is to treat the
physical medium containing the design or instructions as the relevant good. Then a
nonrival input has a high cost of producing the first unit and a zero cost of producing
subsequent units. For General Electric, it may have taken millions of dollars of
engineering work to produce the first mechanical drawing for its current generation turbine
blade, but subsequent drawings can be made at virtually zero cost on a photocopy machine.
Rivalry is closely related to, but distinct from, the notion of excludability. A good
is excludable if someone with a property right can exclude others from taking advantage of
it. For a rival good, possession ensures excludability. The car I drive both rival and
excludable, since it is relatively easy to possess. The space in which I park my car at a
shopping center is also a rival good, but it is one for which it is harder to enforce property
rights. At best, it is partially excludable. Just as a good can be rival and nonexcludable,
goods can be nonrival and excludable. Computer software is a nonrival good, but it can be
made excludable using copy protection or a copyright.
Conventional economic goods are rival and excludable. Public goods are nonrival
and nonexcludable. Intermediate goods were described by Mancur Olson (1965) and
labeled club goods by James Buchanan (1965). (See Sandler and Tschirhart 1980 for a
review of club theory.) Club goods like the right to swim laps in a pool are perfectly
excludable and partially nonrival. Producing the second unit is cheaper than the first, but
eventually, either the cost of subsequent swimming rights rises or their quality falls.
For growth theory, it is partial excludability not partial rivalry that is relevant.
Goods like new mechanical designs, metallurgical formulas, chemical processes, and3
semiconductor designs are purely nonrival. They do not wear out or suffer from
congestion. In this sense they are like basic science, e.g. the advances in solid state physics
that lead to the discovery of the transistor. The difference is that advances in solid state
physics are completely nonexciudable, whereas these goods are at least partially excludable.
Otherwise, they would not be intentionally produced by profit maximizing firms.
The distinction between rivalry and excludability is important because nonrivalry is
inextricably linked to nonconvexities, whereas nonexciudability is not. Under the open
field system, pasture land is a nonexcludable good that is used inefficiently. Efficiency can
be restored by creating a legal system that assigns property rights and establishes
excludability. No nonconvexities are involved. No difficulty for price-taking arises.
The fact that nonrivairy creates a nonconvexity is apparent from the second
definition of a nonrival good as one for which subsequent units have a lower unit cost of
production than the first. For the analysis of technology and growth, it is more revealing
to consider the definition of a purely nonrival good as one that can be used repeatedly.
The most basic premise in our scientific reasoning about the physical world is that it
possible to replicate any sequence of events by replicating the relevant initial conditions.
(This both a statement of faith and a definition of relevant initial conditions.) For
production theory, this means that it is possible to double the output of any production
process by doubling all of the rival inputs. By definition, the nonrival inputs can be used
again in the replica process. Hence, if there are any nonrival inputs that have productive
value, output will increase more than proportionately with an increase in all of the inputs.
If R denotes the set of rival inputs, N the set of nonrival inputs, and F(R,N) denotes
output, then for integer values of A,
F(AR,AN) >F(AR,N)=,\F(R,N).
This means that in the large, the elasticity of output with respect to inputs is greater than
1 and that the function F(.) is not concave.
The structure of this argument is very simple. Once you define the notion of a4
nonrival good and admit the principle of replication, it follows that nonconvexities are
present. Newspaper reports remind us that nonrival goods exist and are important.
H. Previous statements of this argument
So far as I know, the statement of this argument in terms of nonrivairy is new, but
the basic idea is old. Joseph Schumpeter suggested something like this in 1942. Richard
Nelson and Sidney Winter have long recognized its importance for growth and industrial
organization (1982). William Nordhaus (1969) noted this difficulty in his discussion of
invention, and Karl Shell emphasized it in his models of growth (1966, 1967, 1973).
Mancur Olson (1973) discussed the nonconvexity associated with public goods, as did
David Starrett (1977).
In an influential discussion of these issues, Kenneth Arrow (1962) used
"appropriability" in place of "excludability" and "indivisibility" in place of "nonrivairy".
Appropriability is synonymous with excludability, but indivisibility is not quite precise
enough to capture what is really different about goods like designs. Indivisibilities
typically imply local nonconvexities. Nonrival goods create global nonconvexities.
Perhaps because the notion of rivalry remained obscure, or perhaps because
property rights and excludability are easy to contemplate without undermining the notion
of a price-taking equilibrium, what has come to be known as the "appropriability
framework" (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989) has focused on excludability, and has tended to
neglect the essential nonconvexities noted clearly by Arrow and others.
ifi. What about fixed factors and aggregation?
The claim that nonconvexities are unavoidable has not gone unnoticed by defenders
of price-taking. At least three lines of attack on the argument outlined here can be
discerned. They are: 1) that there are fixed factors of production; 2) that nonrival inputs
are hard to measure; and 3) that the nonconvexities may be present, but they are really not.3
veryimportant for aggregate level analysis.
Because there are factors of production that are in fixed aggregate supply, it is
certainly true that it is not possible to replicate all productive activities at the same time.
This is a red herring. Nothing in the logic of the argument establishing the nonconvexities
requires that it actually be possible to double all inputs. What matters for an equilibrium
is what happens to output in any particular production activity if its inputs are doubled,
for example by taking inputs away from some other activity. In any activity, Euler's
theorem implies that that an elasticity of output with respect to all inputs that is greater
than one makes it infeasible to pay each input a rental rate equal to its marginal
productivity. Factors like land or managerial ability that are asserted to be in fixed supply
have alternative uses in production (and consumption), and can be shifted between firms
engaged in the same activity. How they are allocated depends on how they are
compensated, and this depends crucially on convexity.
It is also true that the aggregate quantity of nonrival inputs like processes,
formulas, processes, instructions, and designs is hard to measure. But in the years since
the capital controversies, the assertion that difficulties of measurement and aggregation can
be used to attack theoretical propositions has worn rather thin. These difficulties are
hardly unique to nonrival goods. If you look carefully and worry about things like quality
change and the introduction of entirely new goods, even concepts like gross national
product are plagued with ambiguity.
Concepts that are vague at the aggregate level are obvious at the industry or firm
level. For the personal computer industry, it is clear what we mean by changes in output
or inputs. Industry output (measured in millions of instructions per second of capacity
produced per year) can double because rival inputs double; twice as much aluminum,
silicon, copper, steel, and plastic can be used along with twice as many workers and
machines to produce twice as many physical PC's. Or nonrival inputs can go up when
Intel produces a new design for a microprocessor that lets each new PC run twice as fast.6
IV. But do the nonconvexities really matter?
The faliback position to which some defenders of price-taking retreat is this: Yes,
we admit that nonrival inputs like new chemical reactions, new electronic devices, and
advances in materials science will revolutionize living standards within each individuals
lifetime. And yes, these inputs are intrinsically tied to nonconvexities. But no, we do not
think that this poses a problem for aggregate equilibrium theories based on price-taking.
The argument that nonconvexities might not matter at the aggregate level seems to
be based on two inappropriate analogies. The first is a confusion of nonrivairy with
excludability. If excludability were the only problem, policy towards research and
development would be just like policy toward open fields and national defense: Establish
property rights if this is possible; have the government pay for a good if it is not. If the
problem was merely one of excludability, price-taking would be observed in the markets for
all of the excludable goods. Optimal provision of the public good by the government would
then lead to a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
The deeper problem here is nonrivairy and its associated nonconvexity. Making a
nonrival good excludable does not change the fact that it is nonrival. For a firm like Intel,
selling its goods at marginal cost is not a viable strategy. Giving Intel better copyright or
patent protection may be a good idea, but it will not cause it to behave like a price-taker.
A related argument is that departures from the perfect market assumptions must be
small if there is no evidence of spillovers or external effects. What the evidence is on
spillovers is not entirely clear. In any case, the logic of the argument is wrong. An
economy with perfect patent protection for ideas must exhibit departures from price-
taking. Patents are supposed to create monopolies. Even if patent protection is perfect
and there are no external effects and no spillovers, the associated equilibria will generally
not be Pareto optimal. (For an example of an economy of this type, see my 1987 paper.)
Economists who recognize the presence of nonconvexities sometimes rely on a
second analogy to argue that they are not important at the aggregate level. The canonicalexample of a nonconvexity that can be convexified with large numbers is an indivisibility
that gives firms a U—shaped average cost curve. As the number of identical firms become
very large, price-taking can be supported at a price equal to minimum average cost. This
Idnd of analysis has been used in club theory to show that private clubs can provide the
optimal level of an excludable, partially nonrival good.
The point that should be clear is that not all nonconvexities can be convexified this
way. Large numbers of potential firms do not help if the average cost curve of each
individual firm is globally decreasing. This is exactly the case that arises with nonrival
goods. To see the problem from the production side, letbe the amount of an input x
needed to create a nonrival good y. Then the production possibility set is the union of the
sets {(x,O): x[O,)}and {(x,y): x i and y O} in The closed convex hull of thi
set is the nonnegative orthant in If the original production set is convexified, the
implied technology says that any amount of the good y can be had for free. The only
supporting price for y in terms of x is zero, and a zero price is inconsistent with an
equilibrium in which firms earn nonnegative profits.
V. What is the alternative to equilibrium thry with price-taking?
It is clear enough that we can do general equilibrium theory without assuming pric&
taking. The relevant point was emphasized by Joseph Ostroy (1973,1984): If an economy
has many goods as well as many agents, markets for some goods may still be thin, even in
the limit as the number of goods and agents goes to infInity. Market power can survive.
But in the limit economy, individual agents are small relative to the economy as a whole,
so these "large-square" economies avoid many of the ambiguities that arise in strategic
situations with small numbers of agents.
It is not hard to construct large-square growth models that are directly comparable
with conventional growth models. Examples are given in my 1987 paper, my forthcoming
paper (1990), by Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1989), and by Gene Grossman and8
Elhanan Helpman (1989c). These models differ in the assumptions about spillovers (the
last three have them, the first does not) and about the form of innovations (entirely new
goods, in my models; replacements for old goods in the other two). A product life cycle
model that is closely related to the growth models cited here was described by Paul
Segerstrom, T. C. A. Anant and Elias Dinopolous (1987.)
All of the models have nonrival goods, so they will share a result about trade and
growth. Suppose that two identical economies operate in total isolation from each other.
Because they are identical, they allocate the same resources to the research sector and
make the same discoveries in the same order. In the classical theory of trade with a convex
technology, there are no gains from trade between identical economies. Here, there are
large potential gains from interaction. Because there are no limits on the use of nonrival
goods, there is no reason to have engineers in the different countries solve the same
problem twice. It would be feasible for the engineers of one country to supply the whole
world with the same level of nonrival goods as was produced using both sets of engineers
under total isolation. The worldwide equilibrium with isolation must he Pareto suboptimal
because the engineers in the other country could go on vacation without in any way
reducing worldwide output. If increasing the inputs into research is good for growth and
welfare, the second set of engineers could be set to work on different problems, thereby
doubling the effective resources allocated to research.
The fact that isolation is suboptimal does not necessarily imply that opening trade
will be welfare improving. Even if it is, free trade will not lead to an equilibrium that is
first-best optimal because of the nonconvexities and departures from price-taking that are
present. Nonetheless, what seems to be a robust result is that trade in goods between
similar countries will lead to a welfare improving reallocation of resources used in research.
(Romer 1990, Rivera—Batiz and Romer 1989). Because the countries are similar, the main
effect of opening them to trade will be to induce trade in goods developed through research,
thereby reducing redundancy in research effort.9
When the countries are different, for examp'e when one has a higher ratio of skilled
human capital to raw labor, opening trade will also affect the relative price of human
capital and labor. This can have an ambiguous effect on the market incentives for
undertaking research. If an abundant supply of cheap labor reduces the incentive to
produce nonrival inputs (as in the models described in my 1989 paper and in Grossman and
Helpman 1989c), then for a country like the United States, increased trade with Mexico
might slow down the rate of growth even if increased trade with Europe or Canada would
speed it up.
Without extensive (and implausible) government intervention, equilibria in this
kind of economy will not be first-best Pareto optimal. As a result, economic reasoning
alone can lead to a great variety of counter-intuitive second-best results. The rate of
growth and total research effort might be too high even if there are positive knowledge
spillovers (Aghion and Howitt 1989 and Grossman and Helpman l989c). Tariffs on some of
the goods produced in a country might speed up growth by driving human capital out of
production of these goods and into research (Grossman and Helpman 198gb). Allowing for
reverse engineering and knock-offs of goods by less developed countries might speed up the
rate of introduction of new goods in the developed country; even though the return to
introducing a new good will be lower, the cost of inputs into research might be lower.
Labor that is forced out of manufacturing of goods by the foreign goods will drive down
wages, and some of this labor may shift into into research (Grossman and Helpman,
1989a).
Whether these theoretical possibilities actually occur is the kind of question that
does require systematic data collection and econometric analysis. I have argued (1989)
that there is evidence for a negative effect of labor growth on technological change. Across
countries, across sectors in the United States, and over time in the United States, higher
rates of labor force growth are associated with lower rates of productivity growth. There is
a large body of work that tries to measure the rate of return to research (Griliches 1988).10
Both the private and the social rate of return to research seem high relative to other rates
of return, so there is a presumption that too few rather then too many resources are
devoted to research. This is at least a case in which the formal evidence jibes with the
newspaper reports. As a fraction of GDP, Japan now spends considerably more on
commercial (not basic) research that generates excludable benefits than does the United
States, and the sentiment on both sides of the Pacific seems to be that they are better off
as a result.
The other conjectures remain open. Whether increased trade generally increases
growth rates is still a matter of some debate. Whether copying and product cycle effects
speed up or slow down growth has to my knowledge not been studied in detail.
VT. Conclusion
The oldest question in economics is what causes growth. One of the oldest
conjectures, built into Adam Smiths story of the pin factory, is that nonconvexities are
important for growth and that they create an incentive for international trade that
increases the extent of the market. (For a recent reminder of the fact that nonconvexities
are essential in the pin factory story, see the discussion by Brian Edwards and Ross Starr,
1987.) We now know how to fit this kind of effect into an aggregate growth model, and we
can already see that these models generate many theoretical possibilities. Whatever the
verdict on the details, we have enough evidence in hand to come to a consensus about
whether nonconvexities matter for growth. It seems clear that nonrival goods exist, that
they are important for aggregate growth, and that they are create nonconvexities that
matter for aggregate level analysis. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that Smith's
conjecture about the extent of the market is right. The very notion of nonrivairy suggests
that there are large dynamic gains from trade between similar countries.11
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